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Articles
Do New Neuroimaging Findings Challenge the 
Ethical Basis of Advance Directives in Disorders 
of Consciousness?
ORSOLYA FRIEDRICH, ANDREAS WOLKENSTEIN, RALF J. JOX, NIEK ROGGER, and 
CLAUDIA BOZZARO
Abstract: Some authors have questioned the moral authority of advance directives (ADs) in 
cases in which it is not clear if the author of the AD is identical to the person to whom it later 
applies. This article focuses on the question of whether the latest results of neuroimaging 
studies have moral significance with regard to the moral authority of ADs in patients with 
disorders of consciousness (DOCs). Some neuroimaging findings could provide novel 
insights into the question of whether patients with DOCs exhibit sufficient psychological 
continuity to be ascribed diachronic personal identity. If those studies were to indicate that 
psychological continuity is present, they could justify the moral authority of ADs in patients 
with DOCs. This holds at least if respect for self-determination is considered as the founda-
tion for the moral authority of ADs. The non-identity thesis in DOCs could no longer be 
applied, in line with clinical and social practice.
Keywords: disorders of consciousness; advance directives; personal identity; psychological 
continuity; neuroimaging
Introduction
There is an ongoing discussion about whether recent neuroimaging findings in 
patients with disorders of consciousness (DOCs) reveal partially intact consciousness 
not only in patients in minimally conscious states (MCS), but also in some patients 
in a clinically diagnosed vegetative state, recently renamed “unresponsive wake-
fulness syndrome” (UWS).1,2 The possibility of more intact consciousness in veg-
etative states than was previously understood or expected is not only relevant 
for clinical reasons, but may also be associated with ethical implications. New 
findings around consciousness in patients with DOCs could provide evidence that 
these patients still discharge one of the most discussed necessary criteria of diachronic 
personal identity, namely the psychological continuity criterion. The fulfillment of 
these criteria holds ethical importance, because diachronic personal identity is dis-
cussed by many philosophers as the basis for the moral authority of advance 
directives (AD).3,4,5 Furthermore, DOCs suggest the possibility of borderline cases 
for philosophers, when discussing diachronic personal identity with a psychological 
approach.6,7,8,9 Therefore, this article focuses on the question of whether the latest 
results of neuroimaging studies have moral significance with particular relation to 
the moral authority of ADs in patients with DOCs.
First, we will briefly introduce DOCs and recent neuroimaging findings that 
could allow for the interpretation of more or different states of consciousness, 
present in patients with DOCs. Then we will further outline additional consider-
ations related to the moral authority of ADs and various understandings of 
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D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 U
B
 d
er
 L
M
U
 M
ün
ch
en
, o
n 
05
 S
ep
 2
01
9 
at
 1
3:
45
:0
1,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
 h
tt
ps
:/
/d
oi
.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/S
09
63
18
01
18
00
01
66
Orsolya Friedrich et al.
676
personal identity, before we move on to highlight the relevance of these new 
findings for psychological continuity. Finally, the connection between the moral 
authority of ADs and diachronic personal identity is discussed, as well as to what 
extent neuroscientific results have significance for the moral authority of ADs in 
patients with DOCs.
Neuroimaging Findings in Patients with DOCs
The designation DOC is used for patients with disturbed consciousness, attended 
by impaired verbal and motor responsiveness to diverse stimuli.10 In most cases, 
DOC is caused by acute and severe brain injury caused by head trauma, brain 
hemorrhages, or hypoxic brain injury.11 If the patient survives the coma and the 
patient’s clinical situation stabilizes, an unresponsive wakefulness syndrome 
(UWS) or what was previously referred to as vegetative state (VS) can follow, with 
spontaneous breathing, alternating states of wakefulness (with open eyes) and 
sleep (with eyes closed), and with the ongoing absence of any kind of responsive-
ness.12,13 If reproducible signs of purposeful behavior can be identified in the 
patient; for example, when the eyes follow a moving object, or the patient begins 
to follow simple commands, we use the term MCS, with differing grades.14,15 
Taken together, we refer to MCS and UWS as DOCs in cases in which we do not 
give further differentiation. Important to note, however, is another clinical condition, 
often confused with DOCs: the locked-in syndrome (LIS). In contrast to DOCs, 
patients with LIS have an intact awareness and cognition, yet motor functions are 
strongly reduced or completely lost.16
The diagnosis of DOCs primarily rests on clinical examination and validated 
behavioral test instruments (e.g., Coma Recovery Scale-Revised), supplemented 
by brain imaging and electroencephalography (EEG), the latter of which detects 
the electrical activity of superficial cortical neurons.17,18 The issue of prognosis in 
such cases and finding effective treatment for patients with DOCs is extremely 
difficult.19,20,21
Nevertheless, recent results in advanced neuroscience research could indicate 
real progress regarding the evaluation of consciousness in patients with DOCs. An 
increasing number of studies in the field tend to use neuroimaging techniques for 
DOCs, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).22 fMRI results are 
based on the principle of neurovascular coupling, according to which active brain 
tissue recruits more (oxygenated) blood flow than inactive tissue.23 Blood oxygen 
level dependent response is also used in the relatively new technology of func-
tional near infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS). Yet another functional brain imaging 
method applied in DOC studies is positron emission tomography (PET), which 
detects the metabolically active areas of the brain with the help of radioactively 
marked substances (usually glucose).24 The specific (dis-) advantages of the men-
tioned neuroimaging techniques in DOC are discussed in the article by Lorina 
Naci et al.25
Some general difficulties arise with applying neuroimaging technologies in 
DOCs.26,27,28 More relevant for our purposes are additional conceptual problems, 
given that there is little consensus about the nature and components of conscious-
ness in philosophy, thus leaving it unclear as to which understanding of conscious-
ness these empirical studies relate. It is further controversial in the philosophy of mind 
whether neural correlates give us answers to questions of consciousness at all.29 
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Olivia Gosseries et al. point out that neuroimaging studies in DOCs would require 
a theory of consciousness that describes both the fundamental features of con-
sciousness and sufficient conditions for consciousness.30 Despite these pitfalls, we 
describe some relevant aspects of consciousness in the philosophical literature 
that could be more or less explicitly utilized with neuroimaging studies. Phenomenal 
consciousness, or the qualitative character of experiences, is one important aspect of 
consciousness in the philosophy of mind.31 Another candidate is access conscious-
ness, defined as the subject’s ability to access the representational content of his or 
her mental states.32,33 Still another aspect of consciousness is self-consciousness; that 
is, the reflective knowledge of a person experiencing him- or herself as someone 
who is in a certain mental state, and the ability for self-related reasoning or for 
conceiving of a future self.34 35,36,37 In neurological practice, the distinction between 
arousal (or wakefulness) and awareness seems more important.38
Leaving aside objections from the philosophy of mind concerning the relation-
ship between visible neural activity and consciousness and the general difficulties 
of conceptualizing consciousness, we now can turn to the paradigms used by neu-
roimaging studies to detect consciousness in DOCs. We can distinguish two main 
paradigms: active and passive. In passive experiments, the patient has to do nothing 
in particular, there is no specific instruction; what is relevant is the spontaneous 
brain activity, or the reactivity to stimuli.39 The active paradigm requires the sub-
ject to perform a specific task.40 This active paradigm allows one to distinguish 
between willful brain activation after commands and reflexive brain activity, while 
bypassing (in usual actions necessary, but in DOCs impaired) motor output.41 
Therefore, results from studies that operate on the active paradigm seem to pro-
vide reasonable evidence of consciousness.42,43 In one study, patients with DOC 
were asked to imagine familiar activities (playing tennis and walking through the 
rooms of one’s house); some patients showed similar brain activation patterns 
to those of healthy persons.44,45 The distinct brain activation patterns in the two 
imagination scenarios could be used as a proxy for yes or no responses. In one case 
it was already noted that the patient was able to signal answers regarding per-
sonal questions using this yes-and-no code.46 There are also further studies that 
show a higher brain activation in the auditory cortex if patients with DOCs hear 
their own name, compared with noises or other (common) names.47,48,49 Although 
several of these studies show methodological limitations, their clinical impact on 
diagnosis and prognosis for patients with DOC can be immense.50,51 Active tasks or 
stimuli during neuroimaging could complement the diagnostic procedure and help 
to reduce misdiagnosis.52,53 Such results could—despite conceptual difficulties—also 
indicate the existence of more, or of a higher level of, consciousness in some 
patients with DOCs. Altered neuronal activity in cases when one’s own name is 
spoken may, for example, indicate evidence for the existence of phenomenal con-
sciousness, or for access consciousness. Moreover, increased neuronal activity 
during active mental imagery tasks could provide evidence for at least access 
consciousness, or could even be interpreted as evidence for self-reference and 
self-consciousness.54
Such findings and their interpretation could turn out to be also ethically rele-
vant. Guy Kahane and Julian Savulescu have, for example, argued that results of 
neuroimaging about the existence of phenomenal consciousness in patients with 
DOCs could provide a strong moral reason for not saving the lives of patients with 
DOC.55,56 Carl Fisher and Paul Appelbaum have discussed in detail the broad 
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scientific, legal, and ethical issues that might be related to the latest neuroimaging 
findings in DOCs.57 Jakob Hohwy and David Reutens called for more caution 
when confronted with the question of whether or not to withdraw life support in 
DOCs, if more consciousness in DOC is probable.58 They further argued that it 
would become even more important, in cases of potentially conscious patients, to 
ensure that suffering is alleviated.59 Orsolya Friedrich discusses that the knowl-
edge of more intact consciousness in DOCs would influence end-of-life decision-
making only from the background of certain theories of moral philosophy.60 In 
this article we focus more in depth on the question of whether the results of such 
neuroimaging studies could affect the existence of personal identity in cases of 
DOCs and, therefore, the moral authority of ADs in patients with DOCs. To be 
able to address this problem in greater detail, we will briefly introduce the 
relevant existing debate about ADs and diachronic personal identity.
Moral Authority of ADs and Diachronic Personal Identity
Moral Authority of ADs
Precedent autonomy becomes relevant when decisionmaking capacity is no 
longer present at time 2 (t2) in formerly (at time 1, t1) competent patients.61 If such 
persons were competent, and anticipated at t1 the future medical situation, and 
expressed their will or decisions for that specific situation, we call this form of 
will-expression an AD or living will. In general, we say: The AD is applicable, if the 
specific circumstances (e.g., prognosis, treatment options, or state of consciousness) 
match those the person described at t1 in his or her AD. For the validity of an AD, 
it is important that the AD was authored by the person him- or herself and truly 
represents the authentic will of this person. Details of AD applications are regu-
lated, for example, in the English Mental Capacity Act 2005.62
However, there is an ongoing philosophical debate about the question of if and 
why ADs have a moral authority at t2.63,64,65,66,67 At first sight, the answer appears 
to be a clear “yes”, because the application at t2 is exactly why the person com-
posed his or her AD at t1. This logic has been questioned, however, by several 
authors in bioethics, as to whether ADs have moral authority in cases in which the 
necessary conditions of personal identity are not present at t2.68,69,70,71,72 This cri-
tique seems plausible at least if we follow a line of argumentation for the moral 
authority of ADs, which focuses on securing the respect for the self-determination of 
the patient.73 Many philosophers agree that the moral authority of an AD results 
from its character of being an extension of the patient’s right to self-determination.74 
Therefore, they argue for the given moral necessity not to violate the precedent 
autonomous person’s rights to self-determination and to stick to the AD, as long 
as there are no new, contradicting preferences expressed by the competent 
person.75,76,77
This line of argumentation depends on the presumption that at t1 and t2 we 
have the same person, which means that the AD applies to the same person at t2 
as the one who wrote it at t1. Many influential publications discuss the relation-
ship of diachronic personal identity, personhood, and the moral authority of ADs, 
with varying conclusions.78,79,80,81,82,83 The underlying question is the following: If 
the author of the AD at t1 was not identical with the human being at t2 (non-identity 
thesis), could this imply that the AD from t1 cannot be applied at t2? We do not aim 
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to answer this question here, but rather seek to provide relevant considerations for 
proponents of the non-identity thesis regarding cases of DOCs and novel neuroim-
aging findings. Before we can address this issue further, we must clarify the defini-
tion of diachronic personal identity.
Personal Identity
Since the writings of John Locke, there has been an ongoing debate on how we can 
know that a person is identical at differing points in time (t1 and t2).84,85 One com-
monly suggested criterion for diachronic personal identity that is consistent with 
our everyday experience is that of the body, or the bodily criterion, in which the 
relation of personal identity is constituted by bodily identity.86 For the bodily criterion 
the person one (P1) at t1 and the person X (PX) at t2 do not have to be materially 
identical across time, but the replacement of P1 by PX has to happen gradually.87 
This seems to be the case in everyday life, but this intuitive experience cannot be 
taken as logically or conceptually necessary, as exceptional cases such as brain 
transplantation are at least imaginable.88,89 Therefore, the modified brain criterion 
of personal identity comes into play, as a result of the brain being the part of the 
body that is central for memory or personality.90 A further modification is the physical 
criterion: for personal identity it is necessary to have an identical brain that enables 
a person to live.91
John Locke made a significant contribution to the question of personal identity by 
presenting a different sort of criteria than those we have described. He postulated 
a memory criterion (which he called “consciousness”) and argued that personal 
identity must be a question not of a substance, but rather of relation.92 Crucial for 
Locke as a criterion of personal identity would be “experience-memory”93 which 
would involve our first person perspective and our awareness.94 The circularity 
objection shows that this criterion is challenging or problematic, because memory 
already presupposes personal identity, as we have to assume that the person must 
have done at t1, what that person remembers at t2.95 To resolve this objection, 
Sydney Shoemaker introduced his concept of quasi-memories, which operates with 
the same characteristics as other concepts of memory. However, in the case of a 
quasi-memory, it is enough to have a belief that you did X, even if another person 
did X.96 Harold Noonan suggests a revised memory criterion as following: “P2 at t2 is 
the same person as P1 at t1 just in case P2 at t2 is linked by continuity of experience-
memory to P1 at t1.”97
Other philosophers in line with Locke use a distinction between psychological 
connectedness and psychological continuity.98 Derek Parfit made this distinction 
prominent and defines psychological continuity as “the holding of overlapping 
chain of strong connectedness,”99 whereas “Psychological connectedness is the hold-
ing of particular direct psychological connections.”100 Psychological connections, 
which function as an overlapping chain to psychological continuity, cannot only 
be seen in experience-memory, but also can be seen in unconscious causal links 
between childhood experiences and actual personality traits, or in persisting beliefs 
or desires, or in the connection between intentions and the acts they cause.101,102 
However, determining a degree of sufficient connectedness can be a challenge.
Meanwhile, as would likely be intuitive for most people, a plain psychological 
continuity criterion seems to disregard the embodied character of the mind. Many 
combinations of criteria have been established in the philosophical literature. 
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For example, it could be necessary for personal identity that a non-branching form 
of sufficient continued functioning of the same brain be present, which allows for 
a continuation of the psychological continuity.103,104
Moral Authority of ADs in DOCs
Following this short introduction to the different options for necessary criteria to 
define diachronic personal identity, we now turn to which of these criteria of per-
sonal identity can be ascribed to patients with DOCs. Patients with DOCs seem 
to satisfy the physical criterion of personal identity, as they possess a brain that is 
identical to that which they lived with previously. The issue becomes more diffi-
cult if one suggests that the psychological continuity criterion must be satisfied in 
order to be able to talk about personal identity. Proponents of the non-identity thesis 
might use that strategy and maintain that the psychological continuity criterion 
needs to be applied, but is not met. They conclude that because there is no psycho-
logical continuity, the resulting lack of personal identity destroys the moral author-
ity of ADs. Various authors have stated that with the level of neurological damage 
seen in the case of most DOCs, and especially in UWS, personal identity is lost, 
because the necessary condition of psychological continuity is not present.105,106 
If this is true, it depends on the level that we set as necessary for psychological 
continuity. We can set the threshold of psychological continuity very low; namely, 
to the degree that is required for persistence, which means every state other than 
brain death.107 If we set the limit that low, however, then we lose the difference 
from the physical criterion of personal identity.
If we regard psychological continuity as the relevant relation between states of 
personal identity, patients with DOCs present a more or less (depending on the 
threshold we set) existent challenge in terms of showing a sufficient continuity of 
states. Patients with DOCs, especially those with UWS, do not show clinical signs 
of psychological continuity with respect to criteria such as persisting beliefs, 
desires, intention, or memories. Exceptions are possible with cases in which patients 
meet these conditions, but in general, patients with DOCs do not possess a rich set 
of conscious states and do not show enough robust mental states.108 The topic is 
far from closed, however, as recent results from neuroimaging studies change the 
previous picture. For patients with DOCs, the “flickering flame of conscious-
ness”109 documented in some patients in response to stimuli in new neuroimaging 
studies could emerge as relevant for psychological continuity, and as a condition 
of personal identity. Certain neuroimaging results could further be interpreted to 
suggest that, at least in some cases, patients with DOCs could intentionally reproduce 
imaginations from their past, recall names, and remember their old environment. 
If we could conclude with certainty from neuroscientific results that patients with 
DOCs show signs of intentional mental acting, which is connected to their past 
experiences, diachronic psychological continuity could be posited.
In light of this new evidence, we may go a step further to ask whether psycho-
logical continuity could also be claimed at a phenomenological level, even with-
out necessarily involving higher cognitive capacities that allow for remembering 
or recalling past images or names. Diachronic unity of phenomenal consciousness 
seems to be a pivotal factor for psychological continuity. Phenomenal consciousness 
is characterized by its subjective experiential character, which can be described as its 
“phenomenal aspect” and a “nonstructural homogeneity” from a neuroscientific 
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perspective.110,111,112,113,114 Neuroimaging studies show that phenomenal unity 
could still be retained in patients with DOCs, even if representational unity or 
access unity broke down.115 The question that remains for patients with DOCs is 
whether the “flickers of awareness”116 in patients with DOCs show isolated states 
of consciousness or in fact offer evidence for a single stream of consciousness that 
is phenomenally unified.117 Further empirical studies are necessary to unequivocally 
determine diachronic phenomenal unity of consciousness.
Depending on the conception of personal identity, psychological continuity 
shown in neuroimaging results could create a major shift in influencing our ascrip-
tion of personal identity to patients with DOCs. Findings for patients with DOCs, 
which indicate that psychological continuity is a given, could justify the moral 
authority of ADs in patients with DOCs, if the respect for self-determination is followed 
as a foundation for the moral authority of ADs. Relying on such positive neuroimag-
ing findings, which indicate psychological continuity in patients with DOCs, the non-
identity thesis in DOCs could no longer be applied. Such findings could—in addition 
to conceptual objections—challenge the non-identity thesis, in line with clinical and 
social practice. Usually it is sufficient in practice if psychological continuity is created 
by the person at several points in time; it does not have to be present at every moment 
(e.g., deep sleep, fluctuating mental state). The person should, however, have the 
potential to always create this continuity. This opens up the option for UWS patients 
with a good rehabilitation prognosis to regain this continuity in a few weeks although 
at the moment they clearly cannot realize this continuity.
The general question of the dependence of the moral authority of ADs on dia-
chronic personal identity cannot be solved, nor can the definitive criterion for per-
sonal identity be determined conclusively here. However, the recent empirical 
evidence in patients with DOCs demands a furthering of the ethical discussion, 
and a move beyond viewing DOCs merely as below-border cases for the non-
identity thesis. These results have moral significance, as they provide new possi-
bilities for arguing for the moral authority of ADs in patients with DOCs.
Conclusion
In this article, we have asked whether recent findings in neuroimaging provide 
novel insights into the question of whether patients with DOC exhibit sufficient 
psychological continuity to be ascribed diachronic personal identity. A positive 
answer to this general question could have important consequences with regard 
to the ethical evaluation of ADs, because the argument from the non-identity thesis 
can no longer be put forward against the moral authority of ADs. The argument of 
non-identity holds that because a person issuing an AD at t1 is not identical to the 
person at t2, ADs have no moral authority. If, however, there is sufficient psycho-
logical continuity, as revealed by neuroimaging data, the non-identity thesis 
would no longer hold in these cases.
It should be stated, however, that in practice, these questions appear to occur 
only rarely in the way that they are discussed in philosophy. As articulated previ-
ously, people issue an AD precisely because they want to determine, at t1, certain 
courses of action when they cannot make decisions themselves anymore. From a 
first-person perspective, it therefore appears natural to assume diachronic identity 
between the person at t1 and t2. Of course, philosophically speaking, there are 
many conundrums to solve. In terms of philosophy’s purpose, it should be clear 
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that the phenomenological reality constitutes a goal toward which theorizing 
should strive. The aims of theoretical study must be situated in an ethical land-
scape that features strongly and widely held intuitions and practices, such as those 
associated with taking care of situations in which one can no longer decide for 
oneself. This means that it should be taken as one of the philosopher’s central 
tasks to provide an explanation of real humans’ experiences and expectations, 
apart from expounding and criticizing.
Empirical findings, such as those made possible through neuroimaging, provide 
novel access to the mind of a patient with DOC, and can contribute important 
building blocks toward this goal. Scientific evidence enhances the philosophical 
debate by suggesting paths toward strengthening human practice. There are cases, 
of course, where the empirical reality makes it necessary even to change human 
practice, but, as this article has intended to show, the case of DOC may not provide 
an example for this.
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